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ABSTRACT 
  Drug shortages are a growing problem in the United States. The scope and severity of 
drug shortages has caught the public eye and prodded the FDA into action. Among the potential 
causes of drug shortages are Medicare Part B reimbursement policies, the 340B federal drug 
rebate program, market consolidation and competition in the pharmaceutical industry, regulatory 
overreach by the FDA and manufacturing and supply problems at production plants. What these 
causes have in common is that they can all be understood as dampening profits for manufacturers 
in one way or another. Some causes effectively impose price caps which prevent manufacturers 
from charging a free-market price for their products. Other causes create cost floors which 
stymie cost-cutting efforts by manufacturers. Whether by elevating costs or reducing prices, 
these contributors dampen profits, and without profits, incentives to produce evaporate. Pulling 
these conclusions together, it becomes clear that the best approach to drug shortages is to make 
drug manufacture more attractive by removing price caps and reducing cost floors. Whether 
through tax subsidies, Medicare Part B and 340B drug rebate reform, or relaxed regulatory 
requirements, the most promising approach is one that makes drug manufacture more profitable. 
   3 
 
I. THE PROBLEM OF DRUG SHORTAGES  
  In recent years, drug shortages have become a critical problem in the United States. 
Various American news outlets have reported on the shortages of vital life-saving drugs
1. In 
particular, cancer patients have been especially hard-hit by the disproportionate amount of 
shortages afflicting oncology medication
2. Through its reporting mechanism to monitor drug 
supplies, the Food and Drug Administration
3 has recorded a marked increase in shortages. Non-
governmental organizations such as the American Society of Health System Pharmacists have 
also recorded an increase in the number of shortages.  
  As a result of the media blitz and startling statistics, drug shortages have become a focal 
point of several Senate and House Committee meetings in recent months. The severity of the 
crisis was highlighted by Senator Max Baucus at a Senate Finance Committee hearing on drug 
shortages:  
The types of patients affected by a drug shortage show the seriousness of 
the problem. We read heartbreaking stories of drug shortages forcing cancer 
patients to forgo critical treatment. We hear stories about emergency room 
providers forced to use makeshift drugs when conventional drugs are in 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Jennifer Corbett Dooren, Hospitals Cut Doses Amid Drug Shortage, Wall St. J., Dec.  15, 2011 
(“Hospitals are grappling with a shortage of nutrition drugs and disinfectant products that has led doctors 
to cut doses and ration supplies, prompting patients at a handful of facilities to get sick.”); Gardiner 
Harris, U.S. Scrambling to Ease Shortage of Vital Medicine, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 2011 (“Federal 
officials and lawmakers, along with the drug industry and doctors’ groups, are rushing to find remedies 
for critical shortages of drugs to treat a number of life-threatening illnesses, including bacterial infection 
and several forms of cancer.”); Rob Stein, Shortages of Key Drugs Endanger Patients, Wash. Post, May 
1, 2011 (“Doctors, hospitals and federal regulators are struggling to cope with an unprecedented surge in 
drug shortages in the United States that is endangering cancer patients, heart attack victims, accident 
survivors and a host of other ill people.”). 
2 See Dep't of Health & Human Services, Assistant Sec'y for Planning and Evaluation, Economic Analysis 
of the Causes of Drug Shortages, at 1 (2011) (“Currently, class-wide shortages are affecting the sterile 
injectables segment of the industry, particularly sterile injectable oncology products.”). 
3 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is an executive agency empowered to regulate food, drugs 
and medical  devices (among other products) in the United States. The FDA has a heavy hand in 
American markets, regulating  approximately $1.5 trillion worth of consumer products each year. See Eve 
E. Slater, Today’s FDA, 352 New Eng. J. Med. 293, 293 (2005).  In the area of drugs, the FDA generally 
requires pre-market approval in  order to market pharmaceutical products in the United States. This pre-
market approval takes the form of clinical testing to establish the safety and efficacy of new drugs.   4 
 
short supply. This compromises care in a place where even a minute’s delay 
can mean the difference between life and death.
4 
 
  The White House also joined the fray of concerned parties when President Obama issued 
an executive order in October 2011 directing the FDA to mitigate shortages: 
Shortages  of  pharmaceutical  drugs  pose  a  serious  and  growing  threat  to 
public health. While a very small number of drugs in the United States 
experience a shortage in any given year, the number of prescription drug 
shortages in the United States nearly tripled between 2005 and 2010, and 
shortages are becoming more severe as well as more frequent. The affected 
medicines include cancer treatments, anesthesia drugs, and other drugs that 
are  critical  to  the  treatment  and  prevention  of  serious  diseases  and  life 
threatening conditions.
5 
 
  Much of the discussion on drug shortages has focused on its causes. Frequently cited are 
manufacturing problems, whether due to the difficulty of securing raw materials or unexpected 
production breakdowns. Regulatory burdens and the associated compliance costs are also 
commonly cited. More recently, Medicare prescription drug programs have been implicated, to 
the extent that below-market reimbursement policies make these drugs unprofitable. Less 
frequently cited are prescribing patterns of doctors (primarily oncologists) that tend to disfavor 
certain lower-priced generic drugs. The increased costs of business due to liability suits – 
whether due to product defects or price gouging – has also sometimes come up as a potential 
contributor. 
  The discourse about these commonly-cited causes tends to miss the mark because it is too 
narrowly focused. Academics and bureaucrats spend much time trying to pinpoint the “primary” 
contributor or the “main” cause. What is ignored is that all of these factors are symptoms of the 
underlying problem: Insufficient profits. According to basic economics, a product that can be 
readily produced will be in short supply if the profits are too low. In the drug shortages debate, 
                                                 
4 Drug Shortages: Why They Happen and What They Mean: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th 
Cong. (Dec. 7, 2011) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.). 
5 Exec. Order No. 13,588, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,295 (Nov. 3, 2011). 5 
 
whether the alleged contributors increase the production costs or reduce sales revenue, the 
ultimate effect is to reduce profits for drug manufacturers. When profits in one line of production 
are too low, economically rational manufacturers will direct their capital to other lines of 
production. As a result, any proposed solution to the drug shortages problem that does not 
ultimately promote profitability is unlikely to have much long-lasting effect. 
  The proposal in this paper is to attack the problem of insufficient profits on two fronts: 
(1) Decreasing costs; and (2) increasing revenue. First, by decreasing costs of production and 
regulatory compliance, all else being equal, manufacturers of low-margin generics will see 
increased profits.  Second, by removing price controls from drugs, manufacturers will be free to 
set prices that will maximize their profits and make drug production more lucrative. Revenue can 
also be increased via higher demand and larger market share for manufacturers, though this type 
of intervention is not as effective for pharmaceuticals that have relatively inelastic demand. 
  In terms of structure, this paper will begin with statistics showing the extent of the drug 
shortages problem. It will then discuss potential causes of drug shortages – the usual suspects – 
and commonly-cited fixes to these causes. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the potential 
inadequacy of many of the proposed solutions to the drug shortages problem. In particular, the 
flaw with most of the current “fixes” is that they often ignore that the root cause is likely 
inadequate profits for generics manufacturers. The paper will finish with several proposed 
tweaks to the current market environment that would incentivize drug production. These tweaks 
rely heavily on a free-market approach to supply disruptions. Among the suggestions are 
overhauls of the Medicare drug reimbursement formulas, more streamlined FDA regulatory 
procedures and tax subsidies to incentivize new production lines or existing drug manufacture. 
The drug shortage problem is highly concentrated, and many of these proposed changes would 6 
 
be especially effective for generic sterile injectables. Though none of the tweaks is likely to be 
enough on its own, judging from the experience of vaccine shortages. the combination of small 
fixes is likely to have a real impact.  
 
II. SCOPE AND CONSEQUENCES OF DRUG SHORTAGES 
  1. Magnitude of the problem 
  A drug shortage means that for a particular pharmaceutical medication, there is 
insufficient supply to meet currently existing demand
6. In the United States, two organizations 
collect the most commonly-cited information on drug shortages: The American Society of 
Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP) and the FDA.  
The ASHP has recorded data since 2001, receiving its data from the University of Utah 
Drug Information Service. According to the ASHP statistics, there were 267 national shortages 
in 2011, up from 211 in 2010. The figure for last year is over four times higher than the lowest 
recorded figure (just 58 shortages in 2004) in the ASHP records. The FDA has collected data on 
drug shortages since 2004. It reported 200 shortages as of September 30, 2011, its most recent 
measure of shortages in 2011. This figure is up from 178 in 2010 and more than triple the lowest 
recorded figure (only 56 shortages in 2006).  In sum, using either the ASHP or FDA statistics, 
the number of drug shortages has been increasing annually since 2006.  
 
Year 
 
ASHP/Utah Figures 
 
FDA Figures 
 
2001  120  N/A 
2002  88  N/A 
                                                 
6 Examining the Increase in Drug Shortages: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 
112th Cong. (Sept. 23, 2011) (statement of Dr. Howard K. Koh, Assistant Sec'y of Health, Dep't of Health 
& Human Services) (“The Food and Drug Administration defines a drug shortage as a situation in which 
the total supply of all clinically interchangeable versions of an FDA-regulated drug is inadequate to meet 
the current or projected demand at the patient level”). 7 
 
2003  73  N/A 
2004  58  58 
2005  74  61 
2006  70  56 
2007  129  90 
2008  129  110 
2009  166  157 
2010  211  178 
2011  267  200 (as of Sept. 30/11) 
 
Table 1: Recorded Drug Shortages 
  The figures cited by the ASHP and FDA differ because these organizations use slightly 
different definitions of “drug shortage”. The ASHP and FDA also poll different links in the drug 
supply chain. The FDA data is provided voluntarily by drug manufacturers; by contrast, the 
ASHP receives its data from health care organizations such as hospital pharmacies – i.e. the data 
comes from buyers experiencing shortages. Despite these differences in methodology, the data 
from the ASHP and FDA both exhibit a worsening problem of drug shortages in the past decade.  
  Interestingly, the drugs most prone to shortages tend to be generics and sterile injectable 
drugs. The combined class of products – generic injectables – makes up over 80% of the 
shortages problem
7; almost half of the total generic injectable market is on the shortages list
8. In 
terms of treatment areas, drug shortages tend to be concentrated in five disease areas: oncology, 
anti-infectives, cardiovascular, central nervous system and pain management, with oncology 
drugs making up the highest share of the shortages list at sixteen percent
9. Graphs from the IMS 
Institute for Healthcare Informatics demonstrate the striking propensity for shortages of generics 
and sterile injectables.  
                                                 
7 See Drug Shortages: A Closer Look At Products, Suppliers And Volume Volatility, IMS Institute for 
Healthcare Informatics 4 (2011). 
8 Id. at 3. 
9 Id. 8 
 
 
Figure 1: Characteristics of Current Drug Shortages 
  Another feature of the problem is that most of the drugs in short supply have fewer than 
four unique suppliers. This scenario is demonstrated by Figure 2 below, which plots the number 
of suppliers for drugs in short supply as of August 2011. Over 50% of the drugs are supplied by 
only one or two manufacturers
10. Two-thirds of the drugs have three or fewer suppliers
11. Having 
only a few manufacturers for each product likely has detrimental consequences: Drugs that are 
not in short supply are far more likely to have multiple suppliers
12. Besides the number of 
suppliers, another feature of the drug production industry is that there is a lot of fluctuation in 
which particular firms supply a product. There is a lot of flux in the manufacturing market, with 
                                                 
10 Id. at 9. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 9 
 
many players entering and leaving the market for a particular drug. The overall trend is that an 
increasing number of suppliers have left the markets for good
13.  
 
Figure 2: Number of Suppliers for Drugs Experiencing Shortages 
  2. Consequences of the problem 
  Although a tiny minority of all drugs used in the United States experience shortages in a 
given year
14, the short supply of affected drugs  still has a significant adverse impact on patients 
and health care providers. Drug shortages impose significant labor costs in the healthcare sector, 
estimated at $216 million annually for pharmacists, pharmacy technicians, physicians and 
                                                 
13 Id. 
14 See Economic Analysis of the Causes of Drug Shortages, supra note 2, at 3(typically only about 0.5% 
of all drugs used in the United States experience a  shortage in any given year). 10 
 
nurses
15 to manage shortages. Drug shortages also have a detrimental impact on patients, who are 
often forced to use less desirable, more expensive alternatives with the resulting potential for 
poor patient outcomes
16. A study by the Institute for Safe Medication Practices in September 
2011 found that its respondents experienced over one thousand adverse drug events (including 
medication errors and adverse drug reactions) due to shortages
17. A survey by the American 
Hospital Association in July 2011 found that 82% of the hospital respondents had experienced 
delayed treatment due to shortages, and over half could not provide patients with the 
recommended therapy.  Shortages disproportionately affect generics in the sterile injectable 
market, and sterile injectable drugs are often used for life-threatening diseases and conditions 
such as cancer, intravenous feeding, surgery and emergency medicine. 
Patients who need drugs that are in short supply have only two options: Paying more, or 
using less. However, quite often, patients do not have the option to just “pay more”; as will be 
discussed later in this paper, government price controls on many of the affected drugs make it 
impossible for a patient to induce manufacturers to produce more of a life-saving drug by paying 
more. The result is that for most patients, the only option is to “use less” when it comes to vital 
life-saving medication. Using less often means that doctors and pharmacists have to resort to 
less-effective, more-expensive alternatives that increase the potential for patient harm.  
A salient example of the costs of drug shortages is the case of propofol, a sterile 
injectable generic used in general anesthesia . Between 2009 and 2010, the supply of propofol 
                                                 
15 See Rola Kaakeh et al., Impact of Drug Shortages on U.S. Health Systems, 68 Am. J. of Health-Sys. 
Pharmacy 1811, 1811-19 (2011). 
16 See Economic Analysis of the Causes of Drug Shortages, supra note 2, at 2(citing the results of a 
survey of hospitals that found that a majority “reported problems with drug shortages, including the use of 
less desirable, often more expensive alternatives and the potential for medication errors and poor patient 
outcomes”). 
17 See Drug Shortages: Why They Happen and What They Mean: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 
112th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2011) (statement of Dr. Kasey Thompson, Vice President, American Society of 
Health-System Pharmacists). 11 
 
had become critically low due to recalls stemming from possible contamination at manufacturing 
plants
18. An endoscopy clinic in Nevada tried to manage the shortage by extending its current 
supply and administering propofol vials intended for use by a single patient to multiple 
patients
19. Administering single-use vials to multiple patients is contrary to the safe-use 
information on the propofol label
20. The consequence of this desperate attempt to stem the 
impact of a shortage was severe: The propofol vials were contaminated from improper use, 
resulting in an outbreak of hepatitis C at the clinic with approximately 40,000 were tested for 
potential infection
21. In response to the propofol shortages, the FDA temporarily allowed 
emergency importation of an alternative version of the drug
22. The case of propofol is only one 
of many serious adverse events due to drug shortages.  
 
III. CAUSES OF DRUG SHORTAGES 
  1. Medicare Part B reimbursement policies  
  A prominent villain in the drug shortages debate is the reimbursement mechanism of 
Medicare. Medicare is a federal health insurance program for seniors aged 65 and over, covering 
a large swath of the population (approximately 47 million Americans in 2010)
23. In the drug 
shortages debate, a commonly-cited culprit
24 is the change in reimbursement policies caused by 
the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA). 
                                                 
18 See Valerie Jensen, The Reality of Drug Shortages: The Case of the Injectable Agent Propofol, 363 
New Eng. J. Med. 806 (2010).  
19 Id. at 807. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 See Kaiser Family Foundation, Medicare Chartbook 3 (2010). 
24 See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Shortchanging Cancer Patients, N.Y. Times, Aug.  6, 2011 (opinion 
piece by Ezekiel Emanuel, a former White  House advisor on health care reform, blaming the MMA for 
exacerbating drug shortages); Drug Shortages: Why They Happen and What They Mean: Hearing Before 12 
 
  Before discussing the MMA and its purported effect on drug shortages, it is important to 
describe its target, the Medicare Part B drug reimbursement program. Medicare Part B covers a 
limited number of physician-administered prescription drugs. such as outpatient sterile injectable 
drugs. As mentioned previously, sterile injectable drugs make up a disproportionate part of the 
drugs affected by supply shortages. The reimbursement policies of Medicare Part B determine to 
a large extent how much manufacturers receive for their products. These reimbursement prices 
are administratively determined by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)
25. 
  The MMA adjusted the way reimbursements were calculated for drugs covered by 
Medicare Part B. Prior to its enactment, reimbursement was generally between 85-95% of the 
average wholesale price (AWP) paid to the manufacturer by wholesalers
26. The AWP was 
entirely self-reported, making it easy for drug manufacturers to inflate the figures to receive 
more Medicare money
27. This type of price gouging was at issue in multistate reimbursement 
fraud litigation
28 for false claims made prior to the enactment of the MMA.  
  Partly in response to such price gouging, the MMA changed its reimbursement formula to 
one based on the average sales price (ASP) paid to the manufacturer by all purchasers
29. Under 
the new regime, manufacturers would provide CMS with the average sales price
30 (ASP) and 
                                                                                                                                         
the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2011) (statement of Dr. Scott Gottlieb, Resident Fellow, 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research); Mandy L. Gatesman & Thomas J. Smith, The 
Shortage of Essential Chemotherapy Drugs in the United States, 365 New Eng. J. Med. 1653, 1654 
(2011). 
25 See Dep't of Health & Human Services, Office of Inspector Gen., Monitoring Medicare Part B Drug 
Prices: A Comparison of Average Sales Price to Average Manufacturer Price, at 1 (2006). 
26 Id. at 2.  
27 See Patrick Mullen, The Arrival of Average Sales Price, Biotechnology Healthcare 48-53 (June 2007). 
28 In Re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., (D.Ma. 2007) (multidistrict litigation finding  that 
drug manufacturers engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices by inflating the AWP prices they 
reported to  Medicare for reimbursement). 
29 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-3a(c)(1) (2011). 
30 ASP is “the manufacturer’s sales to all purchasers” divided by “the total number of such units of such 
drug or biological sold by the manufacturer.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-3a(c)(1) (2011). 13 
 
volume of sales of each of their covered drugs on a quarterly basis. Medicare would pay 
manufacturers the ASP over the previous two quarters plus a 6% premium
31.  
  This new reimbursement policy caps the amount manufacturers can charge for their 
products
32, regardless of how much their production costs have changed. Because ASP is 
calculated based on prices from the previous two quarters (six months) of business, if production 
costs rise sharply in the meantime, suppliers cannot charge enough to recoup those losses
33. 
There is some evidence that shortages are more common for drugs with lower average prices and 
hence lower reimbursement rates
34.  In addition, shortages disproportionately affect sterile 
injectables, drugs which are typically physician-administered and reimbursed under Medicare 
Part B
35.  
  One criticism of this explanation is that it does not take into account that most drug 
purchases are funded by private insurance policies. That is, although Medicare Part B accounts 
for a large proportion of drug spending, private insurance is still a significant player. In such a 
case, even if Medicare reimbursement was too low, private reimbursement would higher. The 
response to this criticism is that it assumes that private insurers set their prices independently of 
                                                 
31 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-3a(b)(1) (2011). 
32 For manufacturers participating in the Medicare Part B program, a reimbursement cap is a binding price 
for two reasons. First, the scale of the Medicare Part B program dwarfs that of private industry, which 
means that government reimbursement makes up a larger proportion of supplier revenues. Second, for 
administrative purposes, many private insurers adhere closely to government reimbursement rates. These 
two factors both contribute to making Medicare Part B the dominant player in pricing certain drugs. See 
Paul N. Van de Water, Medicare Changes Can Complement Health Reform, Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities (2008). 
33 See Drug Shortages: Why They Happen and What They Mean: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 
112th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2011) (statement of Dr. Scott Gottlieb, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research) (Medicare Part B “makes it hard for manufacturers to take, and 
sustain price increases to reflect demand or – more importantly -- their rising cost of producing these 
goods.”) 
34 See Economic Analysis of the Causes of Drug Shortages, supra note 2, at 8 (“Among the group of 
drugs that eventually experience a shortage, average prices decreased in every year  leading up to a 
shortage.”) 
35 Id. at 5.  14 
 
Medicare. In fact, however, private insurance prices often mirror Medicare prices
36 because 
private insurers tend to set their reimbursement rates as a percentage of Medicare reimbursement 
schedules. 
  Besides the actual pricing formula used by Medicare Part B, there is also the problem of 
the method of pricing. When computing the reimbursement figures for different drugs, CMS 
does not calculate ASP for a specific type of drug. Instead, CMS groups several drugs together 
into a category and computes the ASP for all of those drugs in that category
37. This means that 
reimbursement is not directly based on ASP for a specific drug, but on the ASP for a specific 
category of drugs
38. The resulting ASP is a rough approximation that penalizes higher-cost drugs 
in a certain category
39. The reimbursement amount will reflect the production expenses of the 
lowest-cost manufacturer. The higher-cost manufacturer is forced to either participate in a “race 
to the bottom”, or else, to discontinue production altogether.  
  2. The 340B federal drug rebate program 
  Also cited as a contributor to drug shortages is the 340B Drug Pricing Program, a 
federally-run drug discounting scheme. The 340B program limits the cost of covered outpatient 
drugs to certain “covered entities” – federal grantees and federally-qualified health centers and 
hospitals
40. Covered entities are typically government-sponsored or supported hospitals and 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., Cristina Boccuti & Marilyn Moon, Comparing Medicare and Private Insurers: Growth Rates 
in Spending Over Three Decades, 22 Health Affairs 230, 234; Van de Water, supra note 32, at 3. 
37 See Economic Analysis of the Causes of Drug Shortages, supra note 2, at 4. 
38 Id. 
39 Because average sales price will diverge from the actual sales price of a particular drugs (that is the 
very definition of an average), the reimbursement amount will produce a windfall for low-cost 
medications at the expense of higher-cost drugs. See Drug Shortages: Why They Happen and What They 
Mean: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2011) (statement of Dr. Scott Gottlieb, 
Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research). 
40 42 USC § 256B(a)(4) (2011). 15 
 
clinics serving vulnerable populations
41. Participation in the 340B program is mandatory for 
pharmaceutical firms whose drugs are covered by Medicare
42. In addition to receiving deep 
discounts, covered entities can also generate additional revenue by seeking reimbursement 
through patients’ insurance policies that exceed the price paid for the drugs
43. Most drug 
manufacturers that participate in Medicare programs have participated in the 340B program since 
its inception
44. 
  The 340B price ceiling is based on a statutory formula
45 that effectively caps the drug 
price at the average manufacturer price. The “average manufacturer price” is the average price 
paid to the manufacturer by wholesalers and retail community pharmacies
46. The price ceiling 
may be even lower than the AMP, however; when the AMP increases more quickly than the 
inflation rate, the manufacturer must pay an additional rebate amount
47.  
  Nearly a third of all U.S. hospitals participate as “covered entities” and force drug 
discounts from manufacturers
48. The benefits to covered entities are clear: Qualified recipients 
typically save between 20 to 50% off the cost of pharmaceuticals and can pocket this difference 
by selling the drugs to patients at a higher price
49. The result is a transfer of surplus from the 
manufacturers to the hospitals, reducing the profitability of drug production.  Things are set to 
                                                 
41 See Gov't Accountability Office, Manufacturer Discounts in the 340B Program Offer Benefits, but 
Federal Oversight Needs Improvement 1 (2011). 
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 256B(a) (2011). 
43 For example, a covered entity may receive Drug X for $100 a unit under the 340B program for which 
they are reimbursed $150 a unit from patients’ insurance companies. The resulting $50 a unit is pure 
profit to the covered entity, but it comes at the expense of the manufacturer. See Manufacturer Discounts 
in the Manufacturer Discounts in the 340B Program Offer Benefits, but Federal Oversight Needs 
Improvement, supra note 41, at 2.  
44 Id. at 3. 
45 The price ceiling is determined by the “rebate percentage”: a percentage amount equal to “the average  
total  [Medicaid] rebate” divided by the “average manufacturer price”. 42 U.S.C. §§ 256B(a)(2) (2011). 
46 42 U.S.C. § 1396R-8(k).  
47 See Manufacturer Discounts in the Manufacturer Discounts in the 340B Program Offer Benefits, but 
Federal Oversight Needs Improvement, supra note 41, at 11. 
48 Id. at 20. 
49 Id. at 2.  16 
 
get worse since the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA 
expands the reach of the 340B program by expanding the list of covered entities and increasing 
the size of the required drug discounts
50. 
  3. Market consolidation and competition 
  Another possible contributor to drug shortages is the increased merger and acquisition 
activity among drug manufacturers. As the argument goes, when manufacturers consolidate, 
there are fewer “niche” firms willing to produce less-lucrative generic drugs
51. The resulting 
behemoths are more likely to focus their greatly-enlarged resources on producing more-lucrative 
pharmaceuticals.   
  The problem with this explanation is both evidentiary and theoretical. On the matter of 
evidence, the little data that exists on the issue suggests that there is little consolidation activity 
in the drug production industry
52. Regarding theory, this explanation ignores that consolidation 
among manufacturers could just as likely mitigate or prevent shortages by reducing competition 
in an otherwise cutthroat industry. While it is true that most of the drugs in short supply are made 
by only one or two companies
53, this fact does not explain why the few remaining firms would 
take advantage of their larger market share to create operational efficiencies. The resulting larger 
firms are uniquely placed to attain cost efficiencies by purchasing suppliers in bulk, for example.  
  4. Regulatory overreach by the FDA 
                                                 
50 See §§7101-7103 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  
51 Letter from Senator Herb Kohl, U.S. Senate, to Chairman Jonathan Leibowitz, Federal Trade 
Commission (May 19, 2011) (Recommending that the FTC give close antitrust scrutiny to drug firm 
mergers because “as the number of drug manufacturers decline, there are fewer and fewer manufacturers 
of older and less profitable products.”).  
52 See Economic Analysis of the Causes of Drug Shortages, supra note 2, at 6 (“We have identified fewer 
than a dozen mergers since 2005, largely relatively small in nature, contradicting the idea that there has 
been a lot of recent consolidation. As merger and acquisition activity does not appear to have grown in 
the last 5 years, it does not appear to be a factor in the recent surge of sterile injectable drug shortages.”). 
53 See IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, supra note 7,  at 9. 17 
 
    The expense of regulatory compliance also potentially contributes to drug shortages.   
Regulatory compliance can be broken down into two types relevant to the drug shortages  
discussion: (1) “Current good manufacturing practices
54” (cGMPs) that increase the costs of  
existing drug production; and (2) regulatory requirements for amendments to abbreviated new  
drug applications (ANDA) that increase the costs of changes to existing manufacturing. 
  Current good manufacturing practices apply to all drug producers, whether branded or 
generic. They refer to FDA regulations regarding the design, monitoring, and control of drug 
manufacturing processes and facilities. Inability to comply with cGMP has been cited as a major 
contributor to drug shortages
55. If a company does not comply with cGMP (as determined by the 
FDA during inspections), any drugs it makes are considered “adulterated” and subject to seizures 
and injunctions
56.  
  The expense of complying with cGMPs may dissuade new entrants or force out current 
manufacturers of drugs in short supply. New entrants already face large start-up costs before they 
can enter the market for a new drug. The additional compliance burden of cGMPs may tip the 
balance in favor of staying out of the new market. In addition, cGMPs may also act to force 
existing manufacturers out of the market. In the generics market that is particularly prone to 
shortages, profitability is very sensitive to small increases in costs
57. Compliance costs are 
                                                 
54 According to the FDA website, cGMPs are regulations that establish systems to assure proper design, 
monitoring and control of manufacturing processes and facilities. The goal of cGMP regulations is to 
establish strong quality control systems and robust operating procedures. 
55 See American Society of Health-System Pharmacists, Drug Shortages Summit 5 (Nov. 5, 2010) 
(“Manufacturing-related causes that contribute to drug shortages are multifactorial. Inability to fully 
comply with  [cGMPs], which results in production stoppages or recalls, was considered a major cause.”);  
56 A drug is “adulterated” if it is “not operated or administered in conformity with current good 
manufacturing practice.” 21 USC § 351(a)(2)(B) (2011).  
57 See Michael P. Link et al., Chemotherapy Drug Shortages in the United States: Genesis and Potential 
Solutions, 30 J. Clinical Oncology 692, 693 (2012) (nothing that the vast majority of shortages have been 
concentrated in sterile injectables, which are relatively inexpensive to purchase and suffer from low profit 
margins). 18 
 
especially high for sterile injectables, the category of drugs that are uniquely vulnerable to 
supply disruptions. 
  Under the Hatch-Waxman Act
58, generic drugs do not have to go through full-scale 
clinical testing if they can prove that they have the same quality, strength, purity and stability as 
brand-name drugs
59. To submit an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA), drug 
manufacturers must prove bioequivalence
60. Although the ANDA approval process produces 
huge cost savings by avoiding wasteful and duplicative clinical testing, other regulatory 
requirements impose substantial costs on generics production. In particular, changes to the 
ANDA generally require FDA approval, which is an expensive and time-consuming endeavor 
for all but the most efficient firms
61. 
  For drug production, many types of manufacturing changes require amendments to the 
ANDA
62. Section 506A of the FDCA lists the notice and approval requirements for  such 
changes to an approved manufacturing process. Changes to (1) components and composition, (2) 
manufacturing sites, (3) manufacturing process, (4) specifications, (5) container closure system, 
and (6) labeling, as well as (7) miscellaneous changes may all qualify as “postapproval changes” 
to the ANDA
63. The specific reporting requirements depend based on whether the changes 
qualify as “major”, “moderate” or “minor”
64.  
  Increased competition in the generics industry means that manufacturers are forced to 
price close to cost. A small price advantage in the cost of supplies, for example, could be the 
                                                 
58 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (colloquially known as the 
Hatch-Waxman Act). 
59 See 21 C.F.R. (S) 314(a) (2011). 
60 A generic must perform in the same manner as the innovator drug to qualify as bioequivalence. See id. 
61 See Dep't of Health & Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, Changes to an Approved NDA 
or ANDA, at 1 (2004). 
62 See 21 C.F.R. (S) 314.70(a) (2011). 
63 See Changes to an Approved NDA or ANDA, supra note 61, at 1.  
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tipping point that makes the generics production profitable or prohibitive. If the manufacturer 
finds that an alternative supply source would make production profitable, they may be unable to 
make the switch because of the costs of going through an ANDA amendment procedure
65. As a 
result, generics manufacturers may find themselves “locked in” to bad supply chains or 
manufacturing procedures, simply because efficient switches are prohibitively expensive.  
  5. Product liability litigation 
  Litigation expenses are just another cost of doing business. In the pharmaceutical 
industry, lawsuits represent a sizeable share of expenses
66. A study by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research found that product liability may reduce efficiency of drug manufacture by 
raising prices without encouraging firms to invest further in product safety
67. The NBER study 
notes that the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, which shielded vaccine 
manufacturers from liability suits, was associated with a rapid decrease in prices for these 
drugs
68.  
  It is unclear how relevant these findings are in the context of sterile injectables and other 
classes of drugs most prone to shortages. There is little information on the extent of product 
liability litigation for drugs in short supply, nor is there relevant information on the expected 
costs of the lawsuits. According to the NBER report, low marginal costs of production in drug 
and vaccine industries means that “even small legal costs can account for a significant fraction of 
                                                 
65 See Drug Shortages Summit, supra note 55, at 3 (“[R]egulatory barriers include the time for FDA 
review of Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDA) and supplemental applications, which are 
required for changes to FDA-approved drug products... Manufacturers described this approval process as 
lengthy and unpredictable, which limits their ability to develop reliable production schedules.”).  
66 See Tomas J. Philipson et al., The Effects of Product Liability Exemption in the Presence of the FDA, 
National Bureau of Economic Research 10 (2009) ("While estimates of the costs of liability for 
pharmaceuticals and devices are few, there are indications that these costs are substantial, especially when 
viewed as a share of marginal costs."). 
67 See id. at 21. 
68 See id. at 30.  20 
 
overall marginal costs”
69. Given the other contributors to shortages – such as price controls and 
strict regulatory requirements – it is unclear whether liability expenses are a significant 
contributor to increased costs.  
  6. Prescribing patterns by doctors 
  The prescribing habits of doctors have also been cited as a contributor to drug 
shortages
70. Like any other economic actors, physicians may alter their work behavior to 
maximize their economic returns. When it comes to treating patients, economic incentives may 
lead doctors to favor certain treatments over others.  
  Oncologists in particular are especially vulnerable to these incentives given that they rely 
on drug sales for half their revenue
71. Many cancer drugs are purchased by patients directly from 
their oncologist, rather than from a pharmacy. As mentioned previously, Medicare Part B only 
pays a 6% premium over the wholesale drug price. Since some of this 6% premium is shared 
with the manufacturer, oncologists are left with a small profit margin on the drugs they prescribe. 
Because the reimbursement is a percentage of the price of a drug, oncologists wishing to 
maximize their profits should favor branded drugs over lower-priced generics. Indeed, there is 
empirical evidence of this change in prescribing patterns
72. In addition, Medicare Part B does not 
                                                 
69 Id. at 39. 
70 See, e.g., Gatesman & Smith, supra note 24, at 1655 (“oncologists need incentives to use generics”); 
Reed Abelson, Drug Sales Bring Huge Profits, And Scrutiny, to Cancer Doctors, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 
2003 (“cancer specialists can make huge sums -- often the majority of their practice revenue -- from the 
difference between what they pay for the drugs and what they charge insurers and government 
programs”). 
71 See Gatesman & Smith, supra note 24, at 1654 (“In recent decades, oncology-drug prices have 
skyrocketed, and today more than half the revenue of an oncology office may come from chemotherapy 
sales, which boost oncologists’ salaries and support expanding hospital cancer centers.”). 
72 See Mireille Jacobson et al., How Medicare's Payment Cuts for Cancer Chemotherapy Drugs Changed 
Patterns of Treatment, 29 Health Affairs 1394, 1394 (2010) (Statistical analysis showed that since 
Medicare Part B became based on ASP, “physicians switched from dispensing the drugs that experienced 
the largest cuts in profitability… to other high-margin drugs.”). 21 
 
fully reimburse the cost of administering complex sterile injectables
73. If the physician is not 
reimbursed for the services associated with sterile injectables and other oncological drugs, they 
may be less likely to prescribe these medications. By prescribing fewer of these drugs, the 
demand is depressed and manufacturers have less of an incentive to manufacture these 
pharmaceuticals.  
  7. Production-related problems 
  Another commonly-cited culprit in the drug shortages debate is the issue of production-
related problems at drug manufacturers
74. The leading reasons for shortages reported to the FDA 
are problems at the manufacturing facility, delays in manufacturing or shipping, and active 
pharmaceutical ingredient shortages
75.  The ASHP has found through its analysis that drug 
shortages are often the result of problems with the manufacturing process, loss of a 
manufacturing site, delays and capacity issues and shortages of raw materials
76. Manufacturing 
difficulties may be particularly acute for sterile injectables, the types of drugs most prone to 
shortages. Sterile injectables require a complex production process and long lead time to bring 
up to speed. In addition, sterile injectables must be manufactured “just-in-time” because of their 
                                                 
73 See id. 
74 See, e.g., Examining the Increase in Drug Shortages: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 112th Cong. (Sept. 23, 2011) (statement of Dr. W. Charles Penley, American Society of 
Clinical Oncology) (“Companies that experience raw material or other manufacturing complications do 
not have the incentive to invest resources required to upgrade facilities or correct quality problems; it is 
not a good business decision”); Thomas M. Burton, GAO Report Blames Drug Shortages on 
Manufacturing Problems, Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 2011 (“”Manufacturing problems were the primary cause 
of most shortages,” says an analysis by the Government Accountability Office.”); Dep't of Health & 
Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, A Review of FDA's Approach to Medical Product 
Shortages (2011). 
75 See A Review of FDA's Approach to Medical Product Shortages, supra note 74, at 4 (“The leading 
primary reasons for the shortages reported to FDA were problems at the manufacturing facility (43%), 
delays in manufacturing or shipping (15%), and active pharmaceutical ingredient shortages (10%).”).   
76 See Drug Shortages: Why They Happen and What They Mean: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 
112th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2011) (statement of Dr. Kasey Thompson, Vice President, American Society of 
Health-System Pharmacists). 22 
 
relatively-short shelf life, making it more difficult to forecast the optimal production level
77. One 
estimate is that 54% of shortages of sterile injectables are due to manufacturing problems
78. 
Some of the most serious quality control problems have affected entire plants, resulting in 
shortages of many drugs. 
  Although it is tempting to view manufacturing problems as an independent cause of 
shortages, the more likely story is that manufacturing problems are just a consequence of another 
underlying cause. Most manufacturing problems would be avoidable if a firm simply invested 
adequate resources to improving its facilities and procedures; if so, then the question becomes 
why doesn’t a firm spend more to improve its production processes? A plausible answer is that 
manufacturers shy away from expensive improvements because of inadequate incentives to 
invest. Put simply, if they are not making enough money on a certain product line, they will have 
little reason to invest to improve that line. If a manufacturer was making a generous profit on a 
drug, it would invest time and effort into making sure manufacturing went smoothly.  
  There is some evidence of the profit-dependence of manufacturing prowess. For one, 
supply disruptions are rare for branded (i.e. higher-priced) drugs with market exclusivity, even 
for difficult-to-manufacture sterile injectables
79. Manufacturers have fewer problems with drugs 
that are shielded from competition, even if these pharmaceuticals have never before been mass-
produced. In addition, drugs that are in short supply in one market are frequently available in 
                                                 
77 Many drugs hit by shortages have a limited shelf life which makes holding excess inventory expensive. 
The result is that drug manufacturers will try to keep their inventories as low as possible by erring on the 
side of undersupply. See Economic Analysis of the Causes of Drug Shortages,  supra note 2, at 4. 
78 See id. 
79 Although approximately half of the sterile injectable market is generic, a disproportionate amount of 
the sterile injectables in short supply are generics. That is, generic sterile injectables are more prone to 
shortages than their branded counterparts. See, e.g., IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, supra note 
7,  at 5 (“In terms of the type of product, 83% or products are multi-sourced generics without patent 
protection or other forms of market exclusivity”); Economic Analysis of the Causes of Drug Shortages,  
supra note 2, at 6 (“Sterile injectable oncology drugs include both generic and branded drugs. 
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another market
80. If the drug shortages were due to problems with the manufacturing process, it 
does not explain why the shortages are confined to particular markets.  
  Another complication is that it is unclear to what extent manufacturing problems are 
simply a consequence of rigorous FDA regulation. As the section on Current Good 
Manufacturing Practices discusses, there has been a fairly recent tightening of regulatory 
requirements for generics and sterile injectable drugs. What may look like a manufacturing 
problem today may have been an acceptable practice yesterday. That is, it is hard to know how 
much of the recent upswing in manufacturing problems is due to something other than enhanced 
regulatory scrutiny by the FDA.  
  8. Group Purchasing Organization contracts 
  A less-frequently cited contributor to shortages is the contracting process occurring 
between manufacturers and Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs) for drug purchases
81. Most 
hospitals and other healthcare organizations do not purchase pharmaceuticals directly from the 
manufacture but do so through GPOs. Thus, prices are negotiated between the manufacturer and 
GPOs
82. Most sterile injectable drugs are purchased through GPOs
83.  The terms of purchase are 
drawn up in GPO contracts which contain many provisions unique to the pharmaceutical 
industry. Relevant to this paper are what known as “failure to supply” clauses, which apply when 
                                                 
80 See Hagop M. Kantarijian, Chemotherapy Drug Shortages: A Preventable Human Disaster, 2 
American Society of Clinical Oncology Post (drug shortages are a "uniquely American problem" because 
prices of generics are slightly higher in Europe than in the United States). 
81 See, e.g., Drug Shortages: Why They Happen and What They Mean: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Fin., 112th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2011) (statement of Dr. Scott Gottlieb, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research); Economic Analysis of the Causes of Drug Shortages,  supra note 2, 
at 5. 
82 This is a slight simplification, because although GPOs negotiate prices with manufacturers, wholesalers 
actually take  physical possession of the drugs. The wholesalers receive a cut from the manufacturer and 
sell these drugs to the  GPO at the GPO negotiated price. However, for the purposes of this discussion, 
this difference is not significant because the relevant contract provisions are those that deal directly with 
the manufacturer. See Economic Analysis of the Causes of Drug Shortages,  supra note 2, at 5. 
83 See id. 24 
 
the manufacturer is unable (or unwilling) to deliver the drugs
84. Failure to supply clauses require 
the manufacturer to pay the GPO the difference between the contract price and the acquisition 
price (for drugs acquired from other sources). However, these clauses offer no reimbursement if 
there are no alternate supplies for a drug. 
  It is unclear whether failure to supply clauses would tend to exacerbate or mitigate drug 
shortages. The FDA takes the position that strengthening failure to supply clauses would 
encourage manufacturers to hold excess inventory and keep manufacturing capacity online
85. 
However, the FDA provides no evidence to support its point and it is just as plausible that 
tightening failure to supply clauses would exacerbate shortages. Such clauses represent an 
additional cost of doing business because manufacturers will have to include the expected 
penalties into their profit projections. No economically rational manufacturer will take on the 
risk of production problems without receiving some additional compensation. Higher costs must 
be offset by higher prices to maintain the same profit margin.    
  GPO contract may also contribute to shortages because of the way they arrange bulk 
purchase agreements with manufacturers by setting a fixed price for many types of drugs. In 
order to win GPO contracts, manufacturers may be willing to sell some drugs below-cost if doing 
so will allow them to sell other highly-profitable products
86. The drugs that are sold below-cost 
are “loss leaders”; these are also the types of drugs especially susceptible to shortages. The 
problem with a “loss leader” approach to negotiating GPO contracts is that it manufacturers may 
prefer to discontinue production of a loss leader rather than its price. Perhaps by the terms of the 
contract, manufacturers cannot raise prices at all, so that the best option is to discontinue 
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production. Even if manufacturers could raise prices, they may be reluctant to do so for fear of 
putting at risk future contracts with the GPO
87. Either way, the result is that there is a perverse 
incentive for manufacturers to discontinue production of low-profit products.  
 
IV. CURRENT RESPONSES TO DRUG SHORTAGES  
1. Legislative fixes: Reporting requirements and regulatory fast-tracking 
  Drug shortages have become a hot topic in Congress, with both Senate and House 
Committee hearings on the issue in 2011. The House Subcommittee on Health held a hearing on 
September 23
rd, 2011 to examine the increase in drug shortages
88. Chaired by Representative 
Joseph Pitts (R-PA), witnesses included representatives of drug manufacturers, oncology clinical 
directors and specialists as well as the assistant secretary for the Department of Health and 
Human Services. Representative Pitts limited the hearing to a discussion on industry and clinical 
experiences with drug shortages and learning what remedies the experts recommended.  On 
December 7
th, 2011, the Senate Committee on Finance met to discuss the causes and 
consequences of drug shortages.
89 Witness testimony came from representatives of the American 
Enterprise Institute and the American Society of Health-System Pharmacists, as well as an 
oncologist and medical professor. In his hearing statement, Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) told the 
committee that the early focus of the Senate was on stating the problem of drug shortages and 
investigating its likely causes. Lastly, another Senate hearing took place on December 15
th, 
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112th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2011). 26 
 
2011
90. The Committee on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, chaired by Senator Amy 
Klobuchar (D-MN), focused on the public health concerns related to drug shortages. Healthcare 
representatives from hospitals and the Department of Health and Human Services provided 
testimony. 
  Though some legislation pertaining to drug shortages has been introduced in Congress, 
the content of the proposed legislation reflects the misplaced concerns of the House and Senate 
hearings but offer little in terms of long-term fixes. Pending legislation would require drug 
manufacturers to give the FDA advance notification of expected shortages. Under current law, 
manufacturers do not have to report supply interruptions to the FDA unless the drug has been 
designated “medically necessary”. However, under existing law, the FDA lacks an enforcement 
mechanism to act against manufacturers who are required to report and fail to do so. The result is 
that effectively, there is no reporting regime.  
  In the Senate, S. 296 has been introduced by Senator Amy Klobuchar
91. If enacted, S. 296 
would require manufacturers to give the FDA six months advance notice (or as soon as possible 
for unplanned stoppages) of supply disruptions or production stoppages that could lead to 
shortages
92. Senate bill 296 also gives the FDA teeth to enforce the notice requirement by 
imposing civil monetary penalties on manufacturers that fail to report
93. A similar House bill, 
H.R. 2245, has been introduced in the House by Representative Diane DeGette
94. The main 
difference between the House and Senate bills is that H.R. 2245 caps the monetary fines that can 
                                                 
90 See Prescription Drug Shortages: Examining a Public Health Concern and Potential Solutions: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 112th Cong. (Dec. 15, 2011). 
91 See Preserving Access to Life-Saving Medications Act, S. 296, 112th Cong. (2011). 
92 Notice is required “at least 6 months prior to the date of such discontinuance or planned interruption or 
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93 See id. 
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be imposed on intransigent manufacturers
95.The precise size of the penalties in S. 296 is left to 
future rulemaking.  
  There are two problems with this proposed legislation. First, it does not prevent 
shortages; at best, it may give the FDA more time to deal with expected shortages. The proposed 
legislation would simply require by law what is now largely voluntary. The manufacturer does 
not have any obligations regarding drug production – the sole responsibility is one of 
notification
96 or contacting the FDA if there is a discontinuance, interruption or adjustment to a 
supply line. Knowing of supply disruptions may allow the FDA to inform affected parties in the 
supply chain (e.g. patients, doctors, hospitals), but it is unclear why this notice requirement could 
not be implemented by private contract instead. For example, the GPO and manufacturer 
contract could require advance notice of supply disruptions, and these private organizations and 
firms would be better placed to tailor reporting requirements to their needs. 
  Second, the legislation could actually exacerbate the problem of shortages by steering 
firms away from product lines that impose regulatory costs. If a company determines that it is no 
longer good business sense to produce a drug, under the proposed legislation, it will have a 
difficult time  immediately shutting down production; rather, there are several legal hurdles that 
may encourage the firm to incur the attendant costs and wait six months before cutting off 
supplies. In addition, the stiff monetary penalties for failing to provide adequate notice may deter 
manufacturers from taking on risky ventures for fear of raising the ire of the FDA. Asking 
manufacturers to give at least six months of notice of supply disruptions is in effect asking 
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96 See, e.g., S. 296 §2(a)(2) (“A manufacturer of a drug described in paragraph (3) shall notify the 
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manufacturers to make predictions about demand in inherently unpredictable markets. If the 
penalty for failing to give adequate notice is high enough, manufacturers may decide to shut 
down otherwise-profitable production lines in order to avoid FDA discipline.  
  2. Executive fixes: Directing the FDA to focus resources on the problem 
  On October 31
st, 2011, the White House issued Executive Order 13588 directing the FDA 
to take steps to reduce prescription drug shortages
97. In the Order, President Obama identified 
drug shortages as posing “a serious and growing threat to public health” and directed the FDA to 
“take steps that will help to prevent and reduce current and future disruptions in the supply of 
lifesaving medicines”
98.  
  The Order directed the FDA to (1) broaden reporting requirements; (2) expedite 
regulatory review; and (3) refer illicit activities to the Department of Justice. To broaden 
reporting, the FDA was directed to administer the reporting requirements in 21 U.S.C. §356C 
and require drug manufacturers to provide “adequate notice” of manufacturing disruptions
99. The 
FDA was also advised to expedite regulatory review of  new drug suppliers, manufacturing sites, 
and manufacturing changes “whenever it determines” that doing so could help mitigate 
shortages
100.  Lastly, the FDA was directed to refer to the DOJ any evidence of market 
participants stockpiling affected drugs or selling them at exorbitant prices
101. 
  The Executive Order is unlikely to have much practical effect on drug shortages. The 
Order lacks the authority to make changes to Medicare reimbursement policies or drug 
manufacturing requirements. Directing the FDA to do whatever it can within its statutory limits 
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is simply restating what the FDA has already been trying to do. At most, the Order may have 
value in attracting public attention to the drug shortages problem. 
  3. FDA fixes: Expedited review of regulatory submissions, temporary importations of 
foreign drugs and broadened reporting of potential shortages 
  The FDA has tried to alleviate shortages by three means
102: (1) Temporary importation of 
unapproved foreign drugs; (2) expedited approvals of regulatory submissions (such as changes to 
manufacturing processes); and (3) broadened reporting of potential shortages. A visual of the 
FDA’s responses is shown below. 
 
Figure 3: Primary FDA Action Taken Between 2010-2011 (Drug Shortages Prevented) 
  The FDA has attempted to eliminate red tape by expediting approval of regulatory 
submissions and allowing temporary emergency importation of certain products. Importation is a 
quick-fix of limited applicability. Assuming that the drugs can even be sourced overseas (that is, 
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that they are not in short supply themselves), there is a safety concern because foreign suppliers 
are not necessarily FDA-approved
103. Reducing red tape is a laudable goal, though it is 
questionable whether the FDA has the right incentives to make this approach work. There is a 
trade-off between efficiency and safety for many regulations. If the FDA only gets attention for 
failures of regulation, it may have little incentive to relax red tape even if the overall social 
benefit is higher.  
  In terms of reporting requirements, the FDA can only require advance notification of 
production stoppages from sole-source manufacturers of certain life-supporting drugs
104.  More 
often than not, however, manufacturers fail to provide notification of actual or potential 
shortages
105. In addition, the FDA does not have explicit enforcement authority under section 
506C, making this provision toothless.  
  Besides these three approaches, the FDA has also tried to mitigate shortages by simply 
asking manufacturers of the same or similar products to increase production. According to its 
report on drug shortages, these requests have frequently been successful
106. However, it is 
questionable whether manufacturers are complying with the FDA request out of basic business 
sense or something more nefarious. It is unlikely the FDA request was the trigger for a rational, 
business decision based on expected demand and price for a product. Rather, fear of running 
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afoul of the agency’s good graces may provide a better explanation. Regulatory retribution can 
impose significant costs on firms, and for at least the short-run, manufacturers may prefer to stay 
in the FDA’s good graces. 
    4. Market fixes: Development of grey markets to take advantage of shortages  
  In its own sinister way, the market has dealt with drug shortages. Grey markets are 
market “fixes” in the sense that these are irregularities that tend to emerge when ordinary supply-
demand mechanisms fail. Where customers are willing to pay more than the binding market 
price to purchase a product, non-traditional channels will inevitably emerge to satisfy that 
demand.  
  The grey market, sometimes known as a parallel market, is a supply channel through 
which a good is traded through distribution channels that are illegal, unofficial or unauthorized 
by the manufacturer. Two preconditions for grey markets are that grey marketers must have a 
source of supply and that the price differentials among the various markets must be great enough 
to make the transaction profitable
107. In the context of drug shortages, both of these preconditions 
are satisfied. The drugs may be in short supply through traditional market channels (i.e. through 
the manufacturer/wholesaler/GPO/hospital supply chain), but may still be available in illicit 
outlets. Any link in the supply chain – whether manufacturer, hospital or patient – may 
participate in the grey market. The price differential is due to the price controls that limit the 
sales price of the drug in regular channels. Since many of the drugs in short supply are life-
saving sterile injectables, the price they command on a truly free market may be exorbitant.  
  Not surprisingly, the advent of drug shortages been accompanied by a marked rise in the 
number of grey markets. A survey by the Premier Healthcare Alliance found that grey markets 
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were common for drugs that were back-ordered or otherwise unavailable. The average markup 
was 650% above the manufacturer’s selling price, with the largest markups concentrated for 
drugs needed to treat the critically ill
108. The concern with grey markets is that they put drug 
integrity at risk. Drugs often have strict storage and handling instructions passed to the buyers. In 
traditional market channels, these safety requirements can be strictly enforced. However, grey 
markets lack the same rigorous controls. Concerns about “drug speculation” via grey markets 
prompted an investigation by Representative Elijah Cummings (D-MD) of the House Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reform
109. Launched in October 2011, the investigation focused 
on drug supply companies that charged prices many times higher than those authorized and 
negotiated with drug manufacturers. Whether the investigation has something other than 
symbolic value is questionable; when the free market price for a product is high enough, firms 
may find it irresistible to participate in the illicit channels.  
 
V. INADEQUATE PROFITS AND DRUG SHORTAGES 
  1. The profit problem  
  As discussed, there are many players in the drug shortages debate. The commonly-cited 
causes focus on different parts of the drug supply chain: Manufacturers, physicians, hospitals, as 
well as private and public insurers. Given the plethora of causes, how do we tackle the problem 
of drug shortages? The data available on the contributors is limited, and many of them may be 
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interrelated such that one reinforces the other. Given this complexity, any proposed solution may 
seem likely to miss the mark or to have an insignificant impact, if at all.  
  Though the problem is complex, it is important not to confuse the consequences with the 
causes. From an economic perspective, there is one “ultimate cause” of drug shortages when you 
consider the economic incentives of the actors: Not enough profits. Supply is the result of a 
manufacturer’s desire to earn profits. If the drug industry were a true free market, drug 
manufacturers would be free to set the optimal price for their products based on forecasted 
demand. The profit motive reigns supreme and economically rational drug manufacturers would 
select a production level and product price to maximize profits. That is, assuming the 
manufacturers, physicians, hospitals, and private and public insurers are economically rational 
actors, their behavior is primarily profit-driven.   
  Economic analysis of drug shortages by the Department of Health and Human Services 
supports this point. This report found that shortages have been “concentrated in drugs where the 
volume of sales and drug prices were declining in the years preceding a shortage, suggesting that 
manufacturers are diverting capacity from shrinking lines of business to growing ones”
110. This 
finding is elementary economics. Where the volume of sales is declining (which is possible even 
if demand remains high) and prices are also declining, the manufacture will see fewer profits. 
When deciding between a low-volume low-price drug and a high-volume-high-price alternative 
product, it is clear that an economically rational manufacturer would choose the latter. 
  Further support for the profit motive comes from the fact that the majority of drugs in 
short supply have three or fewer suppliers
111. These suppliers are not the same across drugs; 
                                                 
110 A Review of FDA's Approach to Medical Product Shortages, supra note 74, at 12. 
111 See IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, supra note 7,  at 9. 34 
 
overall, many firms supply the drugs
112. This data shows an interesting phenomenon. In the 
generic injectables market, though demand generally remains quite high, the supply of the 
critical life-saving drugs is staying the same, suggesting that the many potential suppliers are 
unwilling to shift gears and enter the market. This leads to the question, why are suppliers 
staying out of a (at first sight) lucrative market where there is strong demand for their products? 
From the perspective of economic analysis, the answer is simple: New entrants are staying out 
because of the insufficient profits
113.  
  Many reports make a cursory mention of inadequate profits in their discussion of causes. 
However, profits are almost always treated as an “in addition to” factor. For example, the FDA 
report on drug shortages highlights manufacturing problems and low profits as potential 
contributors, as though these two causes were separable
114. Another example is the Senate 
Committee statement by a representative of the ASHP that “many drug shortages are the result of 
quality issues in the manufacturing process”
115. The correct approach is to see that manufacturing 
problems are a result of  low profits. Firms will invest less in reliable but expensive production 
processes if their profits are too low. 
  2. Price ceiling/cost floor model for a single competitor 
                                                 
112 While over one hundred manufacturers supplied products on the drug shortages list, two-thirds of these 
drugs had three or fewer suppliers. See id.  
113 Generic manufacture is unattractive because many generics are sold for slim profit margins, if any. In 
some cases, the drugs are sold at a loss because of hikes in production and distribution expenses. See, 
e.g., Drug Shortages: Why They Happen and What They Mean: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 
112th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2011) (statement of Dr. Scott Gottlieb, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research); Examining the Increase in Drug Shortages: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. (Sept. 23, 2011) (statement of Dr. W. Charles Penley, 
American Society of Clinical Oncology (“Shortages in cancer drugs are almost exclusively in generic 
sterile injectables, which are generally inexpensive drugs with a very low profit margin.”). 
114 See A Review of FDA's Approach to Medical Product Shortages, supra note 74, at 3, 30.  
115 See Drug Shortages: Why They Happen and What They Mean: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 
112th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2011) (statement of Dr. Kasey Thompson, Vice President, American Society of 
Health-System Pharmacists). 35 
 
  The best way to demonstrate how the causes of drug shortages are ultimately related to 
profits is via elementary economics diagrams as shown below. These are simple supply-demand 
curves which can be used in a fairly stylized example to discuss the impact of price ceilings and 
cost floors (i.e. price floors). Price ceilings are maximum prices that may be charged for goods. 
These maximums may be de facto or de jure: Charging lower prices may be illegal, or a 
regulatory scheme may make it uneconomical to charge less (e.g. Medicare Part B 
reimbursement policies). Price ceilings are thus the effective maximum price that manufacturers 
can charge for their products. According to the earlier discussion, the price ceiling is determined 
by the Medicare reimbursement policies as well as Group Purchasing Organization contracts. 
Before explaining the effect of price ceilings on quantity supplied (see Figure 4), it is important 
to highlight the ideal result – what would happen in a truly free market without government-
imposed price controls. In Figure 4, this ideal scenario is represented by p* and q*, the 
intersection of the supply and demand curves. This point is known as the market equilibrium, 
which represents the natural resting point of quantity sold and purchase price.  
 
Figure 4: Effect of Price Ceilings on Supply 
  Price ceilings result from a lack of patent protection and limited demand for generic 
injectable drugs, factors which reduce the market power of these manufacturers. Along with 36 
 
effective price controls imposed by Medicare reimbursement policies, the price ceiling becomes 
even more intractable. The result of a price ceiling is that prices are inelastic and cannot easily 
reflect growing demand or rising costs.   
  In an imperfect market where there is a price ceiling, the market equilibrium changes. In 
Figure 4, the price ceiling is marked by pceiling. The price ceiling could be an explicit maximum 
price set by law, or it could be an effective price control set by a contract with a consolidated, 
powerful buyer. Where there is a price ceiling, the supply-demand graph changes as follows: The 
demand increases to qd because buyers are attracted by the low price. However, the price is 
artificially low. The amount the supplier is willing to sell plummets to qs. Obviously, qs is less 
than qd, which means that there is a supply shortage in this market. So in this stylized example, 
price ceilings introduce shortages. In the case of drug markets, the demand curve may not be 
quite so flexible as in Figure 3. Demand is likely highly inelastic (that is, not susceptible to 
fluctuations even with large price changes) because patients will buy life-saving medications at 
almost any cost. Drugs that treat critical conditions are likely to have highly inelastic or fixed 
demand. In the context of Figure 4, this fact does not change much. As before, the supplier is 
only willing to sell quantity qs of the drug while the buyer may be unaffected by the price ceiling 
because whatever the price, his demand does not markedly change. 
  There is some empirical evidence linking drug shortages to inadequate profits. A study by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research suggests that price controls stymie drug production 
by dampening profit margins and discouraging new entrants
116. Economic analysis by the 
Department of Health and Human Services found that drugs that eventually experience a 
                                                 
116 See Jean O. Lanjouw, Patents, Price Controls and Access to New Drugs: How Policy Affects Global 
Market Entry, National Bureau of Economic Research 42 (2005) (“the standard argument regarding price 
regulation – that it will dissuade market entry – appears to have more relevance among the high-income 
countries. For these countries, extensive price control is always found to lower the probability of market 
entry”). 37 
 
shortage have an average prices decrease in every year leading up to the shortage
117. By contrast, 
there was an average price increase for drugs that never experienced a shortage in the relevant 
period. Though theoretically, lost revenue from capped prices could be recouped by increased 
market share, the relatively stable absolute demand for sterile injectables and other drugs in short 
supply makes purchasing demand inelastic and somewhat fixed.  
 
 
Figure 5: Effect of Cost Floors on Supply 
  Cost floors, not to be confused with price floors
118, also change the market equilibrium 
point, though in a subtly different manner.  Cost floors are the minimum expenses necessary to 
produce a certain drug, taking into account marginal cost of production as well as the distributed 
fixed capital costs. Marginal costs of production includes the material and labor costs of 
producing one more unit of a good. Capital costs of production include construction costs and 
                                                 
117 See, e.g., A Review of FDA's Approach to Medical Product Shortages, supra note 74, at 12; Drug 
Shortages: Why They Happen and What They Mean: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. 
(Dec. 7, 2011) (statement of Dr. Scott Gottlieb, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research) (“The mean price decrease over these periods leading up to the shortages averaged of as 
much as 27%.”). 
118 The term “cost floor”, as used in this paper, refers to average cost of production. This is not to be 
confused with the common economics term “price floor”. Price floors generally refer to government-
mandated minimum prices for a certain commodity. Average cost (or the “cost floor” as used in this 
paper) is calculated by combining marginal cost and fixed cost and dividing this sum by the production 
quantity.  38 
 
other fixed and generally one-time expenses incurred in setting up the production process. In the 
area of sterile injectables, capital costs can be quite high relative to marginal costs of production, 
due to the low quantity of sales of these medications and the complexity of their manufacture. As 
explained before, cost floors represent the minimum average cost associated with manufacturing 
a drug. An economically-rational manufacturer would seek to maximize its profits and hence, 
minimize its costs. However, costs can only be cut down to a certain point. Perhaps because of 
the minimum compliance costs associated with FDA regulations, or because of the minimum 
costs of active ingredients for pharmaceuticals, there comes a point where costs cannot be 
reduced through smart business sense. Therefore, a firm that wishes to maximize profits must sell 
at some price above this cost floor. This situation is represented by the supply line S1 in Figure 4. 
At this supply line, the quantity supplied will be p1. If the cost floor is increased, however – if it 
becomes more expensive to do business – then the supply line will shift to the left of the supply 
curve. This situation is represented by the supply line stax. Although the shift is labeled as tax-
induced in Figure 5, there are many ways for the cost floor to increase. For drug shortages, 
increasingly stringent FDA regulation and enforcement of production brings costs up. If the 
supply line shifts to the left but the demand line remains the same, the result is that fewer goods 
are supplied. The quantity supplied becomes qtax, which is less than q1 or the optimal supply 
quantity.  A shortage occurs when you include the additional constraint that the price of the 
goods has to be identical for both supply lines, stax and s1. When prices are capped but the cost of 
doing business goes up, the result is that the supplier can only provide qtax amount of goods, 
whereas the customers want to buy q1 quantity of product. Hence, the difference between qtax and 
q1 is the amount by which demand exceeds supply. 39 
 
  The combination of price ceilings and cost floors determines what profits are available to 
the manufacturer after selling the product. Profits equal revenue minus costs
119. For drugs that 
are in short supply, the maximum profit-per-unit is equivalent to the price ceiling minus the cost 
floor for that drug.  A summary of the contributors to price ceilings and cost floors is shown 
below. 
 
Figure 6: Causes of Drug Shortages and the Price Ceiling/Cost Floor Model 
  At the top is the “price ceiling” line, which is the maximum price manufacturers can 
charge for their products. Price caps implemented by Medicare Part B and 340B drug rebate 
programs contribute to the price ceiling. GPO contracts also impose price ceilings because they 
generally pay a fixed price for a package of drugs. In addition, stiff market competition (or at 
least, the threat of it) limits the amount manufacturers can charge. At the bottom is the “cost 
floor” line, representing the minimum costs of production for manufacturers. Besides expenses 
                                                 
119 Revenue is calculated by multiplying the quantity of goods sold by the price; for the purposes of this 
paper, it is assumed that the goods are sold at a fixed price (i.e. that there is no price discrimination). 
Costs are calculated by multiplying the cost floor (also known as “average cost” in economics lingo) by 
the quantity of goods sold.  40 
 
associated with operating the plants and purchasing the raw materials, there are also regulatory 
compliance costs and litigation expenses. Between the price ceiling and cost floor lines are the 
profits available to the manufacturer for the particular drug.  The entirety of this amount may not 
be available to the manufacturer. The manufacturer may have to split its profits with a physician 
to ensure the product is prescribed to patients. Total profits are a function of the total sales 
volume, though as previously discussed, demand is fairly inelastic for sterile injectables.  
  3. Price floor/cost ceiling model for multiple competitors 
  The price floor/cost ceiling model applies well in the context of an individual firm. The 
model gives a simple presentation of the factors that determine how much profit there is to make 
in a particular endeavor. However, the model doesn’t take into account the interactions among 
firms. It looks at the simplified case of a single manufacturer supplying a particular drug. 
Obviously, this is not the market reality.  The drug industry is competitive and natural 
monopolies are rare. As a result, it makes sense to consider how the price ceiling/cost floor 
model works when there are multiple competitors. Each drug manufacturer is going to have its 
own price ceiling and cost floor. Even for the same drugs, firms differ on how much profit they 
can generate. And even with the same profits, firms differ on how much profit they need to stay 
in a market. As a result, it makes sense to consider how firms interact with each other .   
  To begin, consider a case where four competitors decide to enter a promising market for 
the same generic sterile injectable drug. Assume the competitors – Firms A, B, C and D – have 
identical fixed costs but different marginal costs of production.  Assume Firm A is the most 
competitive – that is, it has the lowest costs – all the way down to Firm D which is the least 
competitive.  
   
Firm A 
 
Firm B 
 
Firm C 
 
Firm D 41 
 
 
 
Fixed costs (per 
plant) 
 
 
$1 million 
 
 
$1 million  
 
$1 million 
 
$1 million 
 
Marginal costs 
(per unit 
produced) 
 
 
$1 
 
$2 
 
$3  
 
$4  
 
Breakeven point if 
one million units 
are produced 
 
 
$2 million 
 
$3 million 
 
$4 million 
 
$5 million 
 
Since the drugs these firms produce are substitutable (one firm’s product is bioequivalent to 
another firm’s product), they will compete for the same group of customers. Because the market 
initially has four firms, competition will be fierce. To recoup the large fixed costs associated 
with drug manufacture, the firms will compete on volume. Assume that initially, there is a 
market demand for four million units. At first, all firms will be producing at capacity, though at 
different costs. Assuming that a price of at least $10 per unit can be charged, every firm will an 
incentive to manufacture at full capacity.  
  Though the demand may initially be satisfied by all four competitors, eventually the 
lower-cost firms will want to increase their market share. They can attract customers away from 
their rivals by charging a lower price than their competitors. For example, Firm A will be willing 
to charge less than $10 per unit since its costs are only $1 per unit. To satisfy the additional 
demand,  Firm A will be willing to construct additional plants or invest in new production lines. 
Rival firms will respond by cutting their costs. Assuming a market for 4 million units, Firm A 
will expand its operations and be willing to supply two, then three and finally four million units 42 
 
at a lower price than its competitors. That is, Firm A will try to gain market share by achieving 
economies of scale
120.  
  In the end, vigorous competition will drive price down to cost. With each successive 
round of price-cutting, firms with higher costs will be forced out. Since Firm A has the lowest 
cost, it will be willing to sell to consumers at a price less than $10 per unit. Perhaps it will sell at 
$5 per unit, in which case, Firm E will be on the verge of exit because $5 is its breakeven point 
with respect to profits. Such price-cutting will continue for successive rounds until Firm A will 
price close to cost. For example, Firm A may be capable of supplying four million units – the 
entire demand – at only $1.5 per unit. At this price point, Firms B, C and D will all exit because 
they will not be able to cover their costs. The result of such price-cutting may be that Firm A will 
monopolize the market. Even in more optimistic scenarios – for example, one where the price is 
high enough to cover the costs for all manufacturers – higher-cost firms may exit because they 
can get higher profits elsewhere
121.  Whatever the exact figures are, the general trend will be 
toward driving out higher-cost competitors, leaving only a few firms supplying the entire 
demand.  The influence of price ceilings and cost floors on this process of market concentration 
should be obvious: The lower the price ceiling and the higher the cost floor, the less profitable 
manufacture is, and the more likely higher-cost firms will have to exit.  
  As this discussion has suggested, high fixed cost industries can result in price-cutting that 
drives out many firms. The remaining firms may have little incentive to increase production to 
                                                 
120 “Economies of scale” refers to the cost advantages that firms obtain through expansion. The result of 
functional economies of scale is that average costs (“cost floors” in this paper) decrease. Such economies 
are most common in industries characterized by large fixed costs. Drug manufacture is one such industry 
for which huge quantities of production are needed in order to bring average cost down. 
121 The minimum level of profits that a firm needs in order to continue production is a function of its 
opportunity costs. An “opportunity cost” is the difference between the total profit of the enterprise that 
was chosen and the total profit of alternative enterprises that were not chosen. All things being equal, an 
economically rational firm will chose to exit a market if higher profits are available elsewhere. 43 
 
meet ethereal increases in demand.  Consider the following stylized example for a drug that is 
currently supplied by a single firm.  
   
Scenario A 
 
 
Scenario B 
 
Demand 
 
 
1 million units 
 
1.5 million units 
 
Fixed costs  
 
 
$1 million for one plant (total 
capacity of 1 million units) 
 
 
$2 million for two plants (total 
capacity of 2 million units) 
 
Marginal revenue 
(calculated by subtracting 
marginal cost from price) 
 
 
$1.20 for each unit sold 
 
$1.20 for each unit sold 
 
 
Total profit (assuming the 
entire demand is satisfied) 
 
 
$1.2 million - $1 million = 
$200,000 (subtract fixed costs 
from the total profits) 
 
 
$1.8 million - $2 million = 
loss of $200,000 
 
  In this example, Scenario A represents a demand of one million units. Using the figures 
shown in the table, the end result is that a firm will have $200,000 of profit by producing at full 
capacity and selling at a marginal revenue of $1.20 per unit. This total profit is calculated by 
subtracting the fixed costs from the marginal revenue (since marginal revenue only includes 
marginal but not fixed costs).   
  In Scenario B, the demand for the drug has gone up to 1.5 million units. Assuming the 
cost floor and price ceiling remain unchanged,  the supplier in this market will be unwilling to 
incur the fixed costs of constructing another plant in order to satisfy the increased demand. The 
reasons are as follows: Assume the firm decides to produce 1.5 million units. To do so, it will 
have to construct an additional plant to run at half-capacity. The total fixed costs for constructing 44 
 
both plants will be $2 million. However, the marginal revenue remains unchanged because of, 
for example, government-imposed price caps and de facto cost floors. The result is that the firm 
can only earn $1.8 million in revenue by satisfying the total demand. However, its fixed costs are 
$2 million, which means that in Scenario B, the firm incurs a loss of $200,000. Obviously, the 
economically-rational option in Scenario B is to avoid constructing another plant and to simply 
produce one million units – the capacity of a single plant. This results in a supply shortage. 
  Going back to the price ceiling/cost floor model, we can readily see the effect of 
dampened prices and heightened costs on this phenomenon. De facto price ceilings reduce 
revenues, which affects the incentives of existing and new entrants. Likewise, cost floors also cut 
into the potential profits. In the example above, price ceilings and cost floors will reduce the 
marginal profits of production. If marginal revenue decreases, total profits decrease as well. The 
reduction in profits makes it even less likely that an existing firm will expand its production in 
Scenario B (or that a new firm will enter the market to satisfy the additional demand).  
 
VI. PREVENTING AND MITIGATING DRUG SHORTAGES 
  If the price-ceiling/cost-floor model of drug shortages is accepted, the next question 
becomes, what, if anything, can be done to resolve the problem? As discussed, all of the 
commonly-cited contributors to drug shortages can be understood as dampening profits in one 
way or another. Some factors impose price ceilings which prevent the manufacturer from 
increasing its profits by raising the cost of its products. Other contributors create cost floors 
which stymie any attempt by a manufacturer to further cut costs to keep profits at an attractive 
level.  45 
 
  What the model shows is that an effective solution has to do one of three things: (1) It can 
increase the price ceiling, thereby allowing the manufacturer to charge more for its products; (2) 
it can reduce the cost floor, which makes it cheaper for the manufacture to produce its products; 
(3) it can allocate a greater proportion of the end profits to the manufacturer, thereby reducing 
the opportunity cost of continuing drug production. Whatever route is taken, it is imperative that 
the solutions be long-term fixes. The highly capital-intensive nature of drug production means 
that manufacturers need confidence that they can sustain any price hikes or cost savings over the 
long-term. Short-term solutions deter all but the most risk-preferring firms. It is also important 
that any strategy help private parties help themselves. Solutions that help private parties tailor 
their own fixes are more likely to stick. 
  1. Tax subsidies via credits and deductions 
  Tax subsidies are one potential fix. Whether in the form of credits or deductions, tax 
subsidies reduce the cost floor, thus lowering business expenses. Tax subsidies are common in 
the pharmaceutical industry. Of particular relevance to the drug shortages problem are the tax 
subsidies established by the Orphan Drug Act of 1983. The purpose of the Orphan Drug Act was 
to promote the development of drugs used to treat rare diseases or conditions
122. The Act 
established a fifty percent tax credit on clinical trial expenses for orphan drugs
123. The effects of 
this tax subsidy are difficult to separate from other potential causes, but there has been a marked 
                                                 
122 An orphan drug is a drug for a rare disease or condition which affects such few people that there are 
insufficient financial incentives for firms to develop such drugs. A rare disease or condition means “any 
disease or condition which... affects less than 200,000 persons in the United States”. 21 U.S.C. § 360aa-ee 
(2011). 
123 See Sheila R. Shulman et al., Implementation of the Orphan Drug Act: 1983-1991, 47 Food & Drug 
L.J. 363, 365 (among the production incentives created by the Orphan Drug Act were “development 
grants, protocol 'assistance from the FDA for nonclinical and clinical investigations, tax credits for 50% 
of qualified clinical testing expenses, and a seven-year period of marketing exclusivity.”). 46 
 
increase in the number of orphan drugs released since its passage
124. The success of the tax credit 
established by the Orphan Drug Act makes this approach particularly attractive for sterile 
injectables. The expected returns from drugs that treat rare diseases are too low to cover the high 
fixed costs of research and development
125. Market incentives such as tax subsidies make up the 
profit shortfall and boost the attractiveness of orphan drug manufacture. More specifically, tax 
credits are a type of “push program” which work to reduce the costs of development for orphan 
drugs
126. 
  Similar “push programs” could be used to incentivize sterile injectables production. If the 
purpose is to encourage improvements to the production process, tax subsidies could be offered 
to firms that introduce streamlined manufacturing procedures or upgrade existing facilities (e.g. 
by installing new technologies that reduce quality control expenses). If the purpose is to 
encourage production of specific types of drugs, tax subsidies could be limited to new entrants or 
new manufacturing lines for drugs that are likely to be in short supply (e.g. tying credits or 
deductions to manufacturing sterile injectables). The precise details are a matter for tax 
authorities to work out, though the advantages of a tax subsidy approach are significant if the 
administrative costs are kept down.   
  In terms of supply-demand curves, tax subsidies shift the supply curve to the right. This 
rightward shift means that the manufacturer will be willing to supply a larger quantity of goods 
at a particular price. Because the demand curve will remain unchanged, the manufacturer will be 
willing to accept a lower price for the goods than before. A portion of the surplus from the 
                                                 
124 See Henry Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives for Neglected Diseases: Lessons from the Orphan 
Drug Act 12 (2003) (noting that although causation is difficult to isolate, “…the more than tenfold 
increase in the rate of orphan drug approvals since 1983 is indicative that the Act has indeed been a 
powerful stimulus to increased R&D investment on rare illnesses”). 
125 See id. at 2.  
126 See id. at 9. (“In the push category, one has R&D cost sharing or subsidy programs. These can be done 
through tax credits, research grants, and related economic incentives.”). 47 
 
subsidy will be kept by the manufacturer (in the form of increased profits), and a portion will be 
transferred to consumer wallets. One potential problem with tax subsidies is that they tend to 
distort economic behavior. When one activity is subsidized, you are likely to see more of it, for 
better or for worse. The distortion is not necessarily bad if it can be tailored to achieve desirable 
outcomes such as the increased production of drugs in short supply.  
  2. Less stringent CGMPs and cross-border harmonization 
  Another valuable fix would be to cut back on FDA regulations in the drug production 
industry. FDA regulatory prowess contributes to overall consumer safety by ensuring drug 
integrity. Rigorous FDA regulation of drug production also comes with a cost: Efficiency losses 
in terms of time and money. The challenge in any regulatory debate is at what point the costs 
exceed the benefits: Where does one draw the line between excessive red tape and necessary 
government involvement? Line-drawing is always a difficult exercise, but as discussed 
previously, there are indications that the current FDA regulations are stricter than they should be.  
  The goal for the FDA should be to make its regulations as efficient as possible without 
compromising public safety. It can do so through several changes. First, the Current Good 
Manufacturing Processes should be relaxed. The FDA should remove any unnecessary barriers 
to safe and reliable production. Some suggested changes are to streamlining the process for 
remediating facilities recently taken off line as a result of regulatory action
127; expediting review 
of supplements (i.e. requests to expand or modernize manufacturing facilities) to generic drug 
manufacturing
128; and fast-tracking Abbreviated New Drug Applications for drugs vulnerable to 
                                                 
127 See Drug Shortages: Why They Happen and What They Mean: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 
112th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2011) (statement of Dr. Scott Gottlieb, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research). 
128 For the rest of the almost 3,000 supplements that are on backlog, these applications can sit for months 
and sometimes years owing to a lack of resources to enable their timely review. Though the FDA has an 
expedited review procedure, it only kicks in when the drugs approach shortage status. 48 
 
shortages
129. In terms of supply-demand curves, reduced regulation translates to lower costs for 
manufacturers. When production costs decline, the supply curve shifts right, meaning that a 
greater quantity of goods will be supplied at a particular price.  
   Another regulatory improvement would be to harmonize CGMP requirements across 
borders. Harmonization means a reduction in cross-border regulatory barriers: A company that 
has multiple production facilities worldwide can comply with a single set of regulations. Cross-
border harmonization would increase the size of markets for manufacturers and make large-scale 
investments in production more attractive
130. On the supply-demand curve, the supply curve 
would again shift right to account for the reduced regulatory costs. Another possible effect is that 
the demand curve will shift right as the volume demanded increases. When the market grows, the 
manufacturer will have a greater audience for its products and hence, a greater incentive to 
increase the quantity supplied.  
  The most salient criticism of rolling back regulations is that it could compromise safety. 
as the argument goes, each additional layer of FDA regulations leads to significant gains in terms 
of health and welfare. One problem with this criticism is that it assumes that regulatory 
efficiency is a zero-sum game. However, there is no reason to believe that consumer safety is 
necessarily sacrificed if regulatory burdens are softened. The FDA itself has relaxed regulations 
to deal with drug shortages, with little or no effect on consumer safety
131. 
                                                 
129 See Examining the Increase in Drug Shortages: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 112th Cong. (Sept. 23, 2011) (statement of Dr. W. Charles Penley, American Society of 
Clinical Oncology). 
130 See Drug Shortages: Why They Happen and What They Mean: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 
112th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2011) (statement of Dr. Scott Gottlieb, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research). 
131 One of the most common responses to drug shortages by the FDA has been to exercise “regulatory 
flexibility and discretion” and “expedite regulatory reviews”. Though what is meant by “regulatory 
discretion” is never clearly defined, a report by the FDA suggests that this finding meant that “the benefit 49 
 
  Another problem with this criticism is that it privileges salient gains over invisible losses. 
If the FDA had more lenient manufacturing standards, for example, it is quite possible that some 
people would be harmed by defective products. Any system of regulation is imperfect, but the 
more lenient the standards, the more probable it is that a defective drug will slip through 
unnoticed. To dodge public criticism, the FDA may have an incentive to avoid these highly 
visible costs
132. The resulting invisible losses never enter the accounting. For every patient 
whose life is saved by rigorous production standards, there may be a patient who never had a 
chance because the regulations were too onerous.  
  3. Flexible Medicare Part B reimbursement schedules 
  Perhaps the best candidate for reform is the prime suspect in the drug shortages debate: 
Medicare Part B. The reimbursement policies of Medicare Part B effectively act as price controls 
by imposing a 6% ceiling on manufacturer profits and a race-to-the-bottom pricing formula. A 
modest proposal for reform is to move away from the ASP pricing methodology and adopt 
flexible reimbursement schedules that are better tailored to market conditions. In terms of 
supply-demand curves, when the price goes up, the quantity supplied increases correspondingly. 
Demand decreases to the extent it is inelastic, which is usually not the case for life-saving drugs. 
  One possibility is to base reimbursement on the Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC), the 
price paid by wholesalers on the open market
133. The WAC is a market-based price that allows 
                                                                                                                                         
of the drug was judged to outweigh the risk of the quality or manufacturing issue”. See A Review of FDA's 
Approach to Medical Product Shortages, supra note 74, at 20-21.  
132 Daniel P. Carpenter, The Political Economy of FDA Drug Review: Processing, Politics, And Lessons 
for Policy, 23 Health Affairs 52,53 (“deciding not just if but when to terminate drug review and approve 
an application... is driven by the FDA’s desire to safeguard its reputation for protecting the public’s 
health”). 
133 See Drug Shortages: Why They Happen and What They Mean: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 
112th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2011) (statement of Dr. Scott Gottlieb, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research). 50 
 
firms to incorporate rising production costs and demand
134. Another option is to increase the 
reimbursement for drugs deemed in short supply (or drugs susceptible to shortages), with the 
precise reimbursement amount determined by an individualized review by CMS or some other 
body
135.  Of course, any reform of Medicare reimbursement policies should account for the risks 
of price-gouging that motivated the switch to ASP in the first place
136. There are ways to 
mitigate price-gouging behavior. For example, reimbursement rates can be tied to prices charged 
by manufacturers for similar products in other countries or by other payors
137. Comparison-
pricing would force manufacturers to raise prices for several markets at once or else discount 
Medicare charges. Medicare Part B could also replace its group billing codes with individualized 
billing codes
138. This would allow CWS to base its reimbursement on prices for individual drugs, 
rather than the prices for all drugs within a certain category.  
  A more extreme proposal is to transfer drugs from Medicare Part B into Medicare Part D 
or to adopt the Medicare Part D competitive bidding process for Medicare Part B drugs
139. 
Unlike Medicare Part B, Medicare Part D does not impose price controls on prescription drugs.  
Drugs covered by Medicare Part D are priced via a competitive bidding process
140. By contrast, 
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drugs covered by Medicare Part B are priced through an administrative mechanism that does not 
harness market forces to set an appropriate price.  
  4. Guaranteed purchase programs and stockpiling 
  Besides tinkering with reimbursement rates, some commentators have pushed for 
guaranteed-purchase programs as well as stockpiling for affected drugs
141. Under a guaranteed-
purchase program, the government would provide a fixed demand for affected drugs by agreeing 
to purchase a minimum quantity in a certain time period. The guaranteed purchase would remove 
some of the uncertainty inherent to generics injectables manufacture and encourage production 
of these products. Under a stockpiling system, the government would purchase and store an 
emergency supply of drugs that are experiencing (or prone to experience) shortages. Stockpiling 
would increase demand for drugs, as well as supplement any emergency need for life-saving 
medication. For reasons discussed at length in the next section, neither guaranteed-purchase 
programs nor stockpiling are likely to be successful fixes to drug shortages. 
  5. Limiting the scope of the 340B drug discount program 
  Closely related to Medicare Part B is the 340B drug discount program which also creates 
a price ceiling for covered prescriptions
142. Nearly a third of all U.S. hospitals qualify as 
“covered entities” that are entitled to force drug discounts from manufacturers
143. The purpose of 
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the 340B program is to enable covered entities to stretch scarce federal funding. There is no 
reason why  more rigorous requirements to qualify as a covered entity would not further this 
goal. The great scope of the program suggests it has become less the exception than the rule for 
many U.S. hospitals. Alternatively, the Health Resources and Services Administration should 
perform more rigorous oversight of covered entities to ensure they are not reselling discounted 
drugs and pocketing the price difference
144. The HRSA should also be held to task for 
confirming the eligibility of covered entities
145. If 340B participation is policed more thoroughly, 
manufacturer profit margins will not be as severely squeezed by deep discounting. Lastly, a more 
total solution would be to completely eliminate the program to remove the harmful influence of 
deep discounts on market pricing
146. This option may not be politically viable due to the 
entrenched interests that are unlikely to give up the discounts easily. Regardless, any cuts to the 
scale of the 340B program will have beneficial effects on the drug shortages problem. The 340B 
program imposes price ceilings for drug sales to covered entities; limiting the scope of the 
program removes some of these price ceilings, which will increase the quantity supplied.  
 
VII. LEARNING FROM VACCINE SHORTAGES  
  The experience of vaccine shortages, whether for flu vaccines or those involving 
childhood illnesses, is analogous to the current shortages problem. Between 2000 and 2005, the 
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United States experienced severe shortages of vaccines used against influenza and childhood 
diseases
147. Although most of the supply disruptions are now resolved, vaccine shortages remain 
a threat for the foreseeable future
148. Although there are significant differences between the 
vaccine and sterile injectables markets, the market similarities warrant a closer look at the 
vaccine shortage experience.  
  In terms of similarities, vaccine manufacture is a complicated process because it involves 
biologics (i.e. biological products) rather than simply chemicals
149. Sterile injectables involved a 
similarly complex production process which leads to high production costs that must be 
recouped. Just as generic manufacture is less attractive than branded manufacture in the ordinary 
drug market, in the vaccine field it is more lucrative for firms to enter new markets (e.g. by 
developing the first vaccine for a condition) than to compete in crowded existing markets
150. The 
vaccine market also mirrors the sterile injectable market in that vaccine manufacture involves 
high fixed costs with relatively inelastic demand that attracts only a few producers per 
vaccine
151.  
  1. Causes of vaccine shortages 
  The usual suspects are at play when it comes to possible contributors to vaccine 
shortages. For several years, vaccines sold to the federal government have been subject to 
statutory price caps, though these have since been repealed
152. De facto price controls can still 
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exist if the government plays hardball in price negotiations. To a far greater extent than for 
ordinary medications, vaccines are primarily purchased by public authorities (whether state, local 
or federal governments). As the dominant buyer, the government can force deep discounts but 
with the consequence of making vaccine production unattractive
153.   
  Vaccine production is also plagued by excessively rigorous CGMP standards. At about 
the same time that vaccine shortages became more common, the FDA had begun to adopt more 
demanding regulatory requirements. Stricter rules for quality control systems, in-process testing 
and process validation imposed significant costs on facilities
154. Some plants that had previously 
passed inspections were now failing, contributing to the exits of a number of vaccine 
manufacturers
155.  
Large capital costs for vaccine manufacture added fuel to the fire. The high fixed sunk costs 
of vaccine development and manufacture reflect the complexity of the research and development 
underlying vaccine production
156. Marginal costs may also be high for each batch of vaccines, 
though the marginal cost for each vaccine within that batch may be low
157. High costs combined 
with low prices
158 shrink profit margins.   
  One factor that distinguishes vaccine manufacture from ordinary drug production is 
litigation expenses. Product liability is a more significant risk for vaccines than for ordinary 
drugs because vaccines are often administered to otherwise healthy individuals
159. Without the 
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shield of tort reform, legal expenses would have been prohibitive for vaccine firms hit with 
product liability suits. The threat of an avalanche of suits following a Fifth Circuit decision on 
vaccine-related injuries
160 led Congress to establish the National Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program (VICP) in 1988 as a no-fault alternative to state tort claims
161.  
  These contributors fit nicely into the price ceiling/cost floor model. As a study by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research found, “high fixed costs of regulation and production are 
not barriers to entry if these costs can, with reasonable certainty, be recouped over large volume 
or high margins, or both”
162. That is, vaccine manufacturers have three ways to try to increase 
profits: Increasing sales volume, raising prices or reducing costs. While attractive in theory, each 
of these three methods is likely to fail in practice. Increasing sales volume is difficult because 
demand can be difficult to forecast and the shelf life for vaccines is often very short.
163. Raising 
prices is often not an option for vaccine manufacturers because prices are usually set by contracts 
with dominant purchasers who have significant bargaining power. Reducing costs is also 
difficult for highly-regulated, highly-expensive forms of manufacture like that for biologics-type 
vaccines. Litigation expenses also contribute to cost floors, though its influence may have waned 
since the VICP was established. 
  For vaccines, price ceilings are attributable to federal government lowballing of vaccine 
sales prices. Though price ceilings are not as crippling for vaccines because many of the 
statutory price caps have been repealed, the failure to make up the large fixed sunk costs with 
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market share led to shortages. Cost floors result from significant vaccine development and 
manufacturing costs and significant CGMP compliance expenses. These costs can be hard to 
forecast or control, which further dampens profit expectations for already financially-squeezed 
vaccine manufacturers.   
  2. Responses to vaccine shortages 
  To alleviate vaccine shortages, measures taken include stockpiling and guaranteed 
purchase agreements. Six-month stockpiles were established by Congress for certain childhood 
vaccines
164. Assuming price is adequate, stockpiles increase demand for vaccines, making 
production more attractive. One difficulty with stockpiling is that the government has to predict 
in advance which vaccines it needs. While the demand for childhood vaccines is generally stable, 
demand may be more difficult to forecast for regular drugs. There are less than a dozen 
childhood diseases for which vaccination is routine, but many more conditions are treated by 
regular drugs. Deciding which medications to stockpile and which to leave in short supply would 
be an administrative nightmare.. Manufacturers may also be dissuaded from maintaining 
stockpiles because of revenue recognition rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission
165. 
Another difficulty with non-vaccine drugs is the limited shelf-life of the products (especially for 
sterile injectables) as well as deciding which drugs to prioritize. In addition, stockpiles are not 
cheap: They require advance financial commitments and invite risks that the government may be 
unable to handle
166. In sum, stockpiles are not effective long-term solutions to drug shortages. A 
few months of additional supply would not be enough to cover the demand until new entrants 
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enter the field, if they do so at all. The attendant difficulties of forecasting demand and storing 
supply make stockpiling even less viable as a long-term fix. It’s one thing to consider which of a 
dozen childhood vaccines to stockpile; it’s quite another to select from over one hundred sterile 
injectables treating a myriad of different conditions for different populations. 
  Besides stockpiling, other options are guaranteed purchase agreements where the 
government commits in advance to buying a fixed quantity of drugs or vaccines. By establishing 
a fixed demand (and possibly price) for a product, manufacturers have an easier time forecasting 
expected profits and making a rational economic decision to enter a market
167. Guaranteed 
purchase agreements are particularly valuable for vaccines with a short market life, such as 
influenza vaccines. Such agreements reduce the financial risk for  manufacturers who may be 
stuck with unsold batches at the end of the flu season
168. In theory, guaranteed purchase 
agreements are an attractive option; in practice, they are riddled with the same weaknesses as 
stockpiling. One difficulty with guaranteed purchase agreements is deciding what drugs to buy: 
There is no easy way to decide which life-saving drugs to prioritize. In addition, contracting via a 
“winner-take-all” strategy (where the lowest bidder gets the deal) can have perverse 
consequences by leading to low prices and great uncertainty for suppliers
169. Doling out contracts 
based on the market share of suppliers (e.g. awarding 25% of the purchase quantity to a supplier 
with 25% of market share) invites problems if the market shares change (for example, if some 
manufacturers are unable to meet their obligations due to supply disruptions)
170. Guaranteed 
purchase agreements also run the risk of enshrining the current market participants. Potential 
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competitors may be reluctant to enter a market where existing firms have a guaranteed demand 
for their products.  
 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  Drug shortages are a recent occurrence in the United States.  The scope and severity of 
drug shortages caught the attention of many prominent government officials and organizations. 
The White House responded with an executive order signed by President Barack Obama that 
directed the FDA to do whatever it could to mitigate shortages. Both houses of Congress have 
held committee hearings to investigate drug shortages. Both the House and Senate have also 
proposed legislation that would require drug manufacturers to provide the FDA with advance 
notice of any impending shortage. Lastly, the FDA has been extremely active in detecting 
shortages and trying to find short-term fixes such as allowing streamlined importation of 
alternative drugs.  
  Several suspects have been implicated for either causing or exacerbating drug shortages. 
Among the contributors are the Medicare Part B reimbursement policies, the 340B federal drug 
rebate program, market consolidation and competition, regulatory overreach by the FDA, 
product liability litigation, oncologist prescribing patterns  and production-related problems. 
Though many of these causes appear plausible, the shortages discourse has ignored the 
possibility that these potential contributors have a common-denominator: Insufficient profits. 
Instead, correlation is confused with causation. As a result, though the responses to shortages are 
laudable for raising public awareness, they are also likely to fall short of what is needed to 
combat the problem.  59 
 
This paper has made a modest proposal to “zoom-out” and focus on the ultimate issue 
underlying many of the potential causes: Inadequate profits for drug manufacturers. Viewing 
drug shortages as a problem of low price ceilings and high cost floors has the benefit of 
providing an easy-to-understand framework for looking at the complex interplay of causes. Price 
ceilings limit the price that manufacturers can charge for their products. Potential contributors to 
price ceilings include Medicare Part B reimbursement policies, as well as private insurance 
reimbursement policies that closely track Medicare payout schedules. Cost floors represent the 
minimum production and capital expenses incurred to manufacture products.  Potential 
contributors to cost floors include FDA regulatory overreach.  
  Having outlined the potential contributors to drug shortages, as well as the likely primary 
culprit, this paper has looked at ways to mitigate the problem. At one end are solutions that 
would raise the price ceiling and allow manufacturers to charge more for their products. At 
another end are fixes that would reduce the cost flow and bring down the costs associated with 
manufacture. These proposed solutions aim to make drug production more profitable by 
increasing revenues and reducing costs. Another potential fix would be to increase the size of the 
market for these products. However, this fix would likely have only a minor, if any, impact on 
shortages problems. The drugs affected by shortages are predominantly those with a fairly sticky 
demand.  
  Rising healthcare costs are an important domestic issue. In the healthcare reform debate, 
spiraling prescription drug costs are a popular concern
171. The salience of rising drug costs 
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makes it politically difficult to argue in favor of more profitable drug manufacturers. Drug 
shortages notwithstanding, it will be hard to suggest that “corporate villains” like Big Pharma 
should actually be making more money. Inevitably, some difficult balance will have to be struck. 
There is no way around elementary economics: Manufacturers will supply a drug if there is a 
profit to be made, and if something intervenes to dampen profits, manufacturers will decide not 
to play the game. The lesson from the drug shortages experience is that without profits, 
incentives to produce evaporate.  
 
    
                                                                                                                                         
(“Spending on prescription drugs rose briskly in 2006 as the Medicare drug benefit kicked in and the 
government's share of expenditures for medicines surged”). 